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WHEN PSYCHOLOGY ANSWERS CONSTITUTIONAL 
QUESTIONS: THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND JUVENILE 
SENTENCING 
Emily M. Steiner* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
They say it is necessary for me to suffer!  What’s the object 
of these senseless sufferings?  Shall I know any better what 
they are for, when I am crushed by hardships and . . . weak 
as an old man after . . . penal servitude?  And what shall I 
have to live for then?1 
While weighing whether or not to turn himself in for murder and 
surrender to prison, a 23-year-old law student questions the high 
premium placed on imprisonment as a rehabilitative measure.2  After 
finally submitting to imprisonment, however, Rodion Raskolnikov 
comes to understand the value of atoning for his crimes and how his 
punishment correlates with societal justice.3  The balance struck 
between an appropriate amount of suffering and society’s need for 
justice is at the heart of Raskolnikov’s character development.4   
 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2017, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A., English, 
2014, Elon University.  A very special thank you to the University of Baltimore Law 
Review staff—especially the Production Editors—for being an indispensable part of 
the publication process.  The author dedicates this Comment to her family for their 
constant love and support. 
1. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 529 (William A. Neilson ed., 
Constance Garnett trans., 1917) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
2. See id.; Paul C. Squires, Dostoevsky’s “Raskolnikov”: The Criminalistic Protest, 28 
J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 478, 488, 491 (1937) (“[Raskolnikov] was for 
the time being—immediately following the murders—incapable of 
reflection. . . . [H]e was guilty—so he reasoned—only legally.  The moral law he 
had not transgressed.”) (emphasis omitted). 
3. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 559 (“[Raskolnikov] did not know that the new life 
would not be given him for nothing, that he would have to pay dearly for it, that it 
would cost him great striving, great suffering.  But that is the beginning of a new 
story—the story of the gradual renewal of a man, the story of his gradual 
regeneration . . . .”). 
4. See Paul C. Squires, Dostoevsky’s Doctrine of Criminal Responsibility, 27 J. AM. 
INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 817, 826 (1937) (“[T]he grave problem of 
responsibility cannot be overestimated.  It bids the courts to consider the erring man 
as a whole . . . . [However,] ‘[t]here is no standard by which to measure the soul and 
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Despite Raskolnikov’s imprisonment and accompanying character 
transformation,5 one important question remains unanswered by 
Fyodor Dostoevsky’s novel: at what point does a punishment become 
excessive when compared to the nature of the crime and the 
culpability of the offender?6  Although Raskolnikov is ultimately 
grateful for his imprisonment since it provided him the opportunity to 
repay his debt to society, his all-consuming fear of a punitively 
lengthy prison sentence prevented him from confessing for months 
after committing murder.7  When considering the modern 
implications of the novel, some scholars have argued that, if 
Raskolnikov were alive in the United States today, he would still be 
imprisoned due to the unforgiving nature of the American penal 
system.8  These scholars argue that American prisons have 
abandoned the concept of rehabilitating offenders, and instead, 
simply resort to locking up criminals indefinitely.9  
Although criticism about American sentencing practices is well-
founded,10 constitutional measures are in place to regulate the 
concerns of what constitutes a fair punishment.11  Through the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 
American courts must strike a balance between protecting society 
from criminals and protecting those who are convicted from 
excessive punishments.12  
Due to the vague language in the Eighth Amendment,13 the 
meaning of “cruelty” has been a long-standing question of judicial 
interpretation.14  Historically, in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, 
 
its development.’”) (quoting FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE HOUSE OF THE DEAD 240 
(Constance Garnett trans., 1915)). 
5. See DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 559. 
6. See Squires, supra note 4, at 826. 
7. See DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 529, 545.  Before confessing, Raskolnikov 
believed he would receive no less than twenty years’ imprisonment, when in truth he 
was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.  
8. Ricardo X. Ramos, “Crime and (Cruel and Unusual) Punishment: A Policy 
Recommendation,” 47 REV. DER. P.R. 205, 205 (2008) (“Fyodor Dostoevsky’s, 
protagonist, Rodion Romanovich Raskolnikov, would still find himself in prison had 
[Crime and Punishment] been written in twenty-first century America.  Where 
Raskolnikov found redemption, he would now find no solace in a criminal justice 
system that believes not in redemption, but rather damnation.”). 
9. Id. 
10. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
12. Id. (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.”) (emphasis added). 
13. See id.  
14. E.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988) (plurality opinion) (“The 
authors of the Eighth Amendment drafted a categorical prohibition against the 
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courts have relied upon the values found in American society, labeled 
“evolving standards of decency,” to resolve the ethical questions 
about proportionality of punishment.15  In an effort to bring structure 
and clarity to such a discretionary standard, the Supreme Court has 
often used categorical classifications to determine whether a 
punishment should be regarded as disproportionately severe in 
relation to the crime committed.16  This categorization has included 
comparing offenders who kill to those who do not,17 offenders with 
mental disabilities to those without disabilities,18 and adult offenders 
to juvenile offenders.19  In the last thirty years, Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence has witnessed the most significant evolution within this 
last category of comparison: adult offenders versus juvenile 
offenders.20  
The question of whether juvenile offenders21 should be treated as 
categorically distinct from their adult counterparts was first presented 
before the Supreme Court almost thirty years ago in Thompson v. 
Oklahoma,22 where a fifteen-year-old boy named William Wayne 
Thompson was sentenced to death for his participation in the murder 
of his former brother-in-law.23  The Court asked “whether the 
juvenile’s culpability should be measured by the same standard as 
 
infliction of cruel and unusual punishments, but they made no attempt to define the 
contours of that category.  They delegated that task to future generations of 
judges . . . .”). 
15. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he words of the 
[Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and . . . their scope is not static.  The 
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society.”) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
16. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823 (“Justice Powell has repeatedly reminded us of the 
importance of ‘the experience of mankind, as well as the long history of our law, 
recognizing that there are differences which must be accommodated . . . .” (quoting 
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 590–91 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting))). 
17. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) (finding the death penalty to be a 
disproportionately severe punishment for the crime of rape). 
18. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306–07 (2002) (finding the death penalty to be a 
disproportionately severe punishment for mentally disabled offenders).  
19. See e.g., Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834–38 (finding that because “adolescents as a class 
are less mature and responsible than adults,” the execution of a person who was 
under sixteen years of age at the time of the offense is a disproportionately severe 
punishment).  
20. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100. 
21. In the scope of this Comment, the term “juvenile offenders” is used to encompass all 
offenders under the age of eighteen. 
22. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 818–19. 
23. Id. at 819. 
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that of an adult,”24 and held that, “adolescents as a class are less 
mature and responsible than adults.”25   
To support this conclusion, the plurality relied upon evidence found 
in state statutes, which overwhelmingly banned minors from 
partaking in certain activities such as voting, sitting on juries, 
marrying without parental consent, or purchasing cigarettes.26  The 
Court framed these statutes as an indication that “the normal 
[juvenile] is not prepared to assume the full responsibilities of an 
adult”27 and therefore should not be sentenced as one.28 
This landmark holding established a trend of slowly but steadily 
reducing the culpability of juvenile criminal offenders.29  An 
unspoken, but important influence in this development was the 
corresponding trend of growth in scientific research on juvenile brain 
development.30  Research from the past thirty years indicates that 
adolescent brains are much further from full adult development than 
researchers previously understood.31  Of particular importance is the 
delayed development of the brain’s frontal lobe, which controls 
functions such as reasoning, planning, regulating behavior, and 
personality expression.32  The prefrontal cortex is the last part of the 
brain to fully develop, and it does not reach maturation until a 
person’s early 20s.33   
 
24. Id. at 833. 
25. Id. at 834. 
26. Id. at 823. 
27. Id. at 825 (alteration in original). 
28. Id. at 838 (“In short, we are not persuaded that the imposition of the death penalty 
for offenses committed by persons under 16 years of age . . . . is . . . ‘nothing more 
than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.’” (quoting Coker 
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977))). 
29. See id. at 836–37; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467 (2012). 
30. E.g., Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post–Adolescent Brain 
Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859, 859 
(1999) (“A thorough understanding of human brain development from birth through 
adolescence to adulthood is essential to our understanding cognitive development, 
yet relatively little is known about normal brain maturation.”). 
31. Id. at 860 (“[D]orsal, medial and lateral regions of the frontal lobes showed large 
group differences [between adolescents and adults].”). 
32. Id. (“Neuropsychological studies show that the frontal lobes are essential for such 
functions as response inhibition, emotional regulation, planning and organization.  
Many of these aptitudes continue to develop between adolescence and young 
adulthood.”) (footnote omitted). 
33. Id.; Press Release, Nat’l Inst. of Mental Health, Imaging Study Shows Brain 
Maturing (May 17, 2004) [hereinafter Imaging Study], 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/news/science-news/2004/imaging-study-shows-brain-
maturing.shtml (“‘[H]igher-order’ brain centers, such as the prefrontal cortex, don’t 
fully develop until young adulthood.”). 
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Whether intentional or not, scientific findings on juvenile brain 
development have infiltrated Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.34  
Since 1988, the Supreme Court has increasingly relied on scientific 
research in support of holding juvenile offenders less culpable than 
their adult counterparts.35  By examining recent trends in Supreme 
Court decisions, this Comment will study the steady influence that 
neuropsychological findings have had on juvenile sentencing reform 
through the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment.36  
Part II of this Comment provides the historical background on how 
juvenile and adult offenders came to be considered equally culpable 
within American society.37  Part II also details the scientific research 
on brain development that has undermined the rationale behind such 
rhetoric.38  Part III examines Supreme Court decisions that attempt to 
resolve the question of whether juvenile offenders should be treated 
as categorically distinct from adult offenders.39  Finally, Part IV 
proposes viable alternative practices in place of harsh, lengthy prison 
sentences for juvenile offenders.40 
II.    BACKGROUND 
Teenagers, juveniles, adolescents—no matter what term is used—
the discourse and imagery surrounding this unique group of 
individuals occupies a conflicted space in American society.41  On 
the one hand, juveniles are perceived as naïve, impulsive, easily 
influenced by their peers, and unable to understand the long-term 
consequences of their actions.42  On the other hand, juveniles are 
perceived as predatory, and violent, with no capacity for remorse.43  
In newspapers, broadcasts, editorials, films, and television series, “it 
 
34. See cases cited supra note 29. 
35. See cases cited supra note 29. 
36. See infra Parts II–III. 
37. See infra Part II. 
38. See infra Part II. 
39. See infra Part III. 
40. See infra Part IV.  
41. Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
15, 15 (1997).  
42. Id. (“We see them as wayward youths, as kids gone wrong, but who are nonetheless 
not ‘bad.’  This image is of the teen as a victim.  They are misguided, immature, 
insufficiently socialized, but not evil.”). 
43. Id. (“In contrast, we also see teen offenders as hostile predators, the products of 
unfortunate environments and perhaps heredity, who have little or no human 
sympathy or regard.  This image is of the teen as a full-fledged criminal.”). 
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is not hard to find either image.”44  These depictions “often drive 
public policy” and, more often than not, “[t]he image of the teen 
offender as a criminal seems . . . to predominate.”45  As a result, the 
dialogue frequently pushes toward protecting the public from such 
high-risk, violent offenders by means of lengthy prison sentences.46  
How this discourse began in American society (and its flawed 
foundation) is critical to understanding the current state of Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  
A. “Nothing Works” and the Origin of “Tough on Crime” Policies 
In 1974, an article on prison reform47 became the most influential 
criminological study of the second half of the twentieth century.48  
An American sociologist named Robert Martinson conducted a 
survey of 231 criminal offenders and concluded that rehabilitation 
programs had zero effect on recidivism.49  These findings came to be 
known as “Nothing Works,”50 and they were highly publicized in the 
media.51  After touring the country, “debating criminologists,” and 
advising American policy-makers of his empirical findings, 
Martinson and his research became deeply embedded in American 
perceptions of criminal offenders.52   
Robert Martinson’s work completely undermined the idea that 
rehabilitation efforts were a solid foundation for prison reform.53  
Furthermore, the resulting implication was clear: if “nothing works” 





47. Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 
PUB. INT. 22, 25, 49 (1974) (“[I]t is possible to give a rather bald summary of our 
findings: With few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been 
reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism. . . . I am bound to say 
that these data . . . give us very little reason to hope that we have in fact found a sure 
way of reducing recidivism through rehabilitation.”) (emphasis omitted). 
48. Jerome Miller, Criminology: Is Rehabilitation a Waste of Time?, WASH. POST, Apr. 
23, 1989, at C3 (“Martinson’s views were enthusiastically embraced by the national 
media, often under the headline, ‘Nothing Works!’”). 
49. Martinson, supra note 47, at 24–25. 
50. Miller, supra note 48.  
51. Id. 
52. Jerome G. Miller, The Debate on Rehabilitating Criminals: Is It True that 
Nothing Works?, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, 
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/rehab.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2016). 
53. Id. 
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than to incarcerate offenders to maintain order and safety.54  With the 
reported murder rate in the United States doubling between 1963 and 
1973, the concept “that this explosion of street crime must be due to 
an attitude of permissiveness” was persuasive.55  Statistically, “[w]hat 
looked . . . like permissiveness was more often than not neglect and 
chaos in a system overcome with an explosion of ‘baby-boomers.’”56  
Nevertheless, imprisonment became the knee-jerk reaction to juvenile 
offenders in the 1980s and early 1990s.57  Although there were critics 
who challenged Martinson’s conclusions, his influence persisted and, 
eventually, spread into juvenile sentencing.58  Thus, as a 
consequence, “[h]arsher sentences [and] warehouse prisons” 
emerged.59 
To compound the effect of “nothing works,” the arrest rate of 
juveniles for gun-related homicides reached its peak in 1994.60  
Researchers began using this statistic to speculate on future crime 
rates.61  One theory was based on “the growing number of 
disadvantaged and under-socialized youth in big cities,” deemed 
“juvenile super-predators.”62  These individuals were expected “to 
 
54. Id. (“Since ‘nothing works’ in rehabilitating offenders, we must deter and 
incapacitate them through harsher prison sentences and occasional use of the death 
penalty.”). 
55. Id. (“The decade from 1963 to 1973 saw reported murders double from 4.5 per 
100,000 to 9.07 [per 100,000].”). 
56. Id.  
57. Shelley Zavlek, Planning Community-Based Facilities for Violent Juvenile 
Offenders as Part of a System of Graduated Sanctions, JUV. JUST. BULL. (Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 2005, at 2–3, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/209326.pdf (“[T]he juvenile violent crime 
arrest rate rose sharply during the mid-1980s and early 1990s, from 139 arrests per 
100,000 youth ages 17 and younger in 1985 to 231 arrests per 100,000 youth in 
1994—a 66-percent increase.”). 
58. See generally Paul Gendreau & Robert R. Ross, Correctional Treatment: Some 
Recommendations for Effective Intervention, 34 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 31 (1983) 
(challenging the quality of Robert Martinson’s research and the conclusion that 
correctional rehabilitation is ineffective). 
59. Miller, supra note 52.  
60. Howard N. Snyder, Juvenile Arrests 1999, JUV. JUST. BULL. (Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2000, at 1, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/185236.pdf (“In 1999, law enforcement 
agencies in the United States made an estimated 2.5 million arrests of persons under 
age 18.”).  
61. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S LESSONS FOR 
URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL 49 (2012) (“There were two widely held theories to 
explain the unexpected increase in urban violence, and each was associated with a 
series of proposals for shifts in crime control policy.”). 
62. Id. 
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expand at least as fast as the youth population in the 20 years after 
1990.”63  The projected estimate was as follows:  
By the end of this decade there will be a million more 
people between the ages of fourteen and seventeen than 
there are now . . . This extra million will be half male.  Six 
percent of them will become high rate, repeat offenders—
30,000 more young muggers, killers and thieves than we 
have now.  Get ready.64  
Extrapolating even further, some researchers predicted that “[b]y the 
year 2010, there will be approximately 270,000 more juvenile super-
predators on the streets than there were in 1990.”65  These 
calculations led to the consensus that “Americans are sitting atop a 
demographic crime bomb.”66  To address the problem of the juvenile 
super-predator, policy-makers opted to “give the American people 
what they ha[d] been demanding for years—incarceration for violent 
and repeat criminals.”67 
Projections of the “juvenile super-predator,” along with 
Martinson’s findings, were unfounded.68  Martinson conducted his 
research using a flawed approach and overstated his findings; he even 
acknowledged these mistakes in 1979.69  Regarding the “juvenile 
super-predator,” the numbers were not even close to being accurate.70  
The failure of these projections, however, did not diminish their 
effect on American perceptions about juveniles.71   
 
63. Id. 
64. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
65. Id. at 82. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. See Snyder, supra note 60, at 1 (“In 1999, for the fifth consecutive year, the rate of 
juvenile arrests for Violent Crime Index offenses—murder, forcible rape, robbery, 
and aggravated assault—declined.  Specifically, between 1994 and 1999, the 
juvenile arrest rate . . . fell [by] 36%.  As a result, the juvenile violent crime arrest 
rate in 1999 was the lowest in the decade.”) (emphasis added). 
69. Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding 
Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 243, 253–54 (1979) (“The very evidence 
presented in the article indicates that it would have been incorrect to say that 
[rehabilitative] treatment had no effect. . . . I withdraw this conclusion.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
70. Compare ZIMRING, supra note 61, at 82 (predicting that from 1990 to 2010 there 
would be approximately 270,000 more dangerous juvenile offenders on the streets), 
with Charles Puzzanchera, Juvenile Arrests 2010, JUV. JUST. BULL. (Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Washington, DC.), Dec. 2013, at 5, 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/242770.pdf (proving that in 2010 the number of juvenile 
violent crime arrests has been the lowest since 1980). 
71. See supra Part II. 
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The combination of “nothing works” and “juvenile super-
predators” led to “tough on crime” policies in the early and mid-
1990s.72  These policies treated juvenile and adult offenders as 
equally culpable because charging juveniles as adults effectively 
“teaches youth a lesson,” which promotes deterrence.73  The research 
and experience of the past fifteen years, however, has demonstrated 
that these statements are unsubstantiated.74  
B. Understanding Adolescent Brain Development 
In addition to the miscalculations of “nothing works” and “juvenile 
super-predators,” scientific findings have also undermined the 
rhetoric behind juveniles as violent and dangerous offenders who are 
incapable of rehabilitation.75  To understand juvenile culpability, one 
must understand the juvenile brain.76  In the last thirty years, 
neuropsychological research on adolescent brain development has 
expanded considerably, which has changed the way adolescent 
judgment and decision-making are understood today.77   
Since 1999, neuroscientists have been using new technologies to 
study the human brain, and have discovered that adolescent brains are 
further from full, adult development than previously understood.78  
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) reveals that the frontal lobe 
undergoes enormous change between early adolescence and young 
adulthood.79  The prefrontal cortex, which is part of the frontal lobe, 
 
72. Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to 
Delinquency?, JUV. JUST. BULL. (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention, Washington, D.C.), June 2010, at 1–2, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/220595.pdf (“The nationwide policy shift 
toward transferring juvenile offenders to the criminal court is based largely on the 
assumption that more punitive, adult criminal sanctions will act as a deterrent to 
juvenile crime.”). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 2 ("[T]he bulk of the empirical evidence suggests that transfer laws have little 
or no general deterrent effect.”). 
75. Malcolm Ritter & Associated Press, Experts Link Teen Brains’ Immaturity, 
Juvenile Crime, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=3943187 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2016). 
76. See Mary Beckman, Crime, Culpability, and the Adolescent Brain, 305 
SCIENCE 596, 596 (2004), http://users.loni.usc.edu/~thompson/PDF/MBscience.pdf. 
77. See, e.g., Imaging Study, supra note 33 (finding that “higher-order” brain functions, 
such as the pre-frontal cortex of the brain’s frontal lobe, “don’t fully develop until 
young adulthood”). 
78. See Sowell, supra note 30, at 859 (“We had expected brain image analysis to reflect 
considerable frontal maturation by age 16.”). 
79. Id. at 860 (“[D]orsal, medial and lateral regions of the frontal lobes showed large 
group differences [between adolescents and adults].”). 
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controls “‘executive’ functions,” such as reasoning, planning, 
personality expression, emotional regulation, and behavioral 
inhibition.80  This is the last area of the human brain to mature.81  
Frontal lobe development continues at a rapid pace until young 
adulthood.82  Additionally, what constitutes “young adulthood” is not 
limited to a person’s early twenties; studies show that “myelination,” 
which is “a cellular maturational event” in the brain, “begins near the 
end of the second trimester of fetal development and extends well 
into the third decade of life and beyond.”83 
Delayed frontal lobe development in adolescent brains provides the 
foundation for understanding why juveniles commit crimes.84  In a 
study conducted by The MacArthur Foundation,85 the results of this 
delayed development were: short-sighted decision-making, poor 
impulse control, and vulnerability to peer pressure.86   
In measuring short-sighted decision-making, the study—which was 
comprised of adult and adolescent participants—found that 
adolescents frequently characterized themselves as “less likely to 
consider the future consequences of their actions” than adults.87  
Additionally, when subjects “were presented with various choices 
measuring their preference for smaller, immediate rewards versus 
larger, longer-term rewards . . . adolescents had a lower ‘tipping 
point.’”88 
In measuring impulse control, the study found that, “as individuals 
age, they become less impulsive and less likely to seek thrills.”89  In a 
task where the goal was for subjects to solve a puzzle in the least 
amount of moves possible (with a wrong move resulting in extra 
moves to undo the mistake), “adolescents took less time to consider 
their first move, jumping the gun before planning ahead.”90 
 
80. See Imaging Study, supra note 33. 
81. See id.; Sowell, supra note 30, at 859.  
82. See Jay N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Adolescent Brain, 
1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 77 (2004). 
83. See Sowell, supra note 30, at 859 (emphasis added). 
84. See Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK ON 
ADOLESCENT DEV. & JUV. JUST. 3 [hereinafter Less Guilty], 
http://www.adjj.org/downloads/6093issue_brief_3.pdf. 
85. About Us, MACARTHUR FOUND., https://www.macfound.org/about/ (last visited Dec. 
16, 2016) (explaining that the MacArthur Foundation is “one of the nation’s largest 
independent foundations,” supporting research on “some of the world’s most 
pressing social challenges, including over-incarceration”). 
86. Less Guilty, supra note 84, at 2–3. 
87. Id. at 2. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 2–3. 
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Finally, the study found that vulnerability to peer pressure 
decreased from adolescence to adulthood.91  Risk-taking was 
essentially “activated” in adolescents by the very presence of peers.92  
In a computerized car-driving task, “the mere presence of friends 
increased risk-taking in adolescents and college undergraduates, 
though not adults.”93 
The results of this study support the finding that, while most 
adolescents are close to adults in cognitive abilities of understanding 
and processing information, they are still less capable than adults in 
using these abilities to make good decisions.94  The lack of 
experience and susceptibility to social and emotional influences can 
significantly affect juvenile decision-making.95  Although juveniles 
may be able to distinguish certain behavior as dangerous or 
irresponsible, intervening causes, such as peer pressure, may prompt 
adolescents to engage in criminal activity anyway.96  These findings 
illustrate the need to consider the developmental stage of adolescence 
as a mitigating factor when juveniles face prosecution.97   
III. PROOF OF THESIS  
Despite the growth in neuropsychological research about 
adolescent brain development, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
initially rejected such findings in American constitutional law.98  This 
reluctance to treat juvenile offenders differently from adult offenders 
was illustrated in Stanford v. Kentucky, where the plurality rejected 
the claim that the death penalty was unconstitutional as applied to 
sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders.99   
On the issue of adolescents’ lack of maturity and lessened 
culpability, the plurality unequivocally rejected the scientific research 
cited by petitioner as a potentially mitigating factor against the 
 
91. Id. at 3. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. See Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk 
Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An 
Experimental Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 625, 625 (2005). 
95. See id. 
96. Id. 
97. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: 
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death 
Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1015–16 (2003). 
98. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377–78 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
99. Id. at 380. 
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juvenile’s culpability.100  Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, 
stated, “The battle must be fought . . . on the field of the Eighth 
Amendment; and in that struggle socioscientific, ethicoscientific, or 
even purely scientific evidence is not an available weapon.”101 
Despite Justice Scalia’s assertions that constitutional arguments are 
uninfluenced by neuropsychological findings, Supreme Court 
decisions since Stanford have increasingly come to rely upon 
“socioscientific” evidence to diminish juvenile culpability, which has 
effectively limited juvenile sentences on Eighth Amendment 
grounds.102  Whether this reliance occurred deliberately or not, the 
results were the elimination of the juvenile death penalty,103 and 
juvenile life-without-parole sentences (LWOP).104 
A. Roper v. Simmons and the Juvenile Death Penalty 
Research on adolescent brain development had its first significant 
legal impact in 2005 with the Supreme Court case Roper v. 
Simmons,105 in which the Court found that the imposition of the death 
penalty for offenders who were under the age of eighteen when they 
committed their crimes violated the Eighth Amendment.106  The 
Court held that imposing the death penalty on juveniles is cruel and 
unusual punishment disproportionate to the offense when considering 
a juvenile’s level of culpability as a mitigating factor.107   
In concluding that even older adolescents are less culpable than 
adults,108 the Court relied on adolescent brain development research 
and compared the findings to the decision in Atkins v. Virginia, which 
held that the imposition of the death penalty for adults with 
 
100. Id. at 377–78. 
101. Id. at 378 (emphasis added). 
102. See cases cited supra note 29. 
103. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (“The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition 
of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes 
were committed.”). 
104. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (“The Constitution prohibits the 
imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not 
commit homicide.”); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (“By 
requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration 
without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and age-related characteristics 
and the nature of their crimes, the mandatory sentencing schemes before us violate 
this principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment.”). 
105. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569, 578. 
106. Id. at 578. 
107. Id. at 564–75. 
108. See id. at 571, 574. 
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diminished mental capacity was unconstitutional.109  In Atkins, the 
Court held that defendants whose decision-making abilities are 
impaired by developmental disabilities are less blameworthy than 
those without impairment.110  In Roper, the Court drew parallels to its 
findings in Atkins that mental disability “diminishes personal 
culpability even if the offender can distinguish right from wrong,” 
and that this “make[s] it less defensible to impose the death penalty 
as retribution for past crimes and less likely that the death penalty 
will have a real deterrent effect.”111 
Relying upon the “scientific and sociological studies [on adolescent 
brain development] . . . cite[d] [by the respondent],”112 the Roper 
Court referenced three primary differences between adolescents and 
adults.113  First, juveniles have “[a] lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility . . . . [which] often result in 
impetuous and ill-considered” behavior.114  Second, “juveniles are 
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside 
pressures, including peer pressure,” and are less able to remove 
themselves from settings that might lead to crime.115  Third, the 
personalities of juveniles are still forming at this age.116  In support of 
each of these pronounced differences, the Court cited psychological 
and scientific research on adolescent behavioral development.117   
The Court further emphasized the transitory nature of adolescence 
in that even psychiatrists are prohibited from diagnosing a patient 
under the age of eighteen as having antisocial personality disorder 
because “[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate 
between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet 
transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime 
reflects irreparable corruption.”118   
 
109. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
110. Id. at 318. 
111. Roper, 543 U.S. at 563 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318–20). 
112. Id. at 569. 
113. Id. at 569–70. 
114. Id. at 569 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 
(1993)). 
115. Id. (first citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982); then citing 
Steinberg & Scott, supra note 97, at 1014). 
116. Id. at 570. 
117. Id. at 569–70 (first citing Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A 
Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 339 (1992); then citing 
Steinberg & Scott, supra note 97, at 1014; and then citing ERIK H. ERIKSON, 
IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968)). 
118. Id. at 573. 
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By overtly relying upon scientific findings to lessen the culpability 
of juvenile offenders, the rationale of the Roper Court directly 
contrasted with the rationale of the Stanford plurality.119  After the 
abolition of the juvenile death penalty, the next development in 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence arose with a challenge to LWOP 
sentences for juveniles who did not commit or intend to commit 
homicide.120   
B.  Graham v. Florida and Juvenile LWOP Sentences for Non-
Homicide Offenses 
In July 2003, when a boy named Terrance Jamar Graham was 
sixteen years-old, he and three other teenagers attempted to rob a 
barbecue restaurant in Jacksonville, Florida.121  The robbery was 
ultimately unsuccessful, and Graham was charged as an adult 
offender.122  Graham pled guilty under a plea agreement, and the trial 
court withheld adjudication of guilt.123  Approximately one year later, 
Graham was arrested again for participating in a home invasion 
robbery.124  After concluding that Graham had violated his probation, 
the trial court held a sentencing hearing.125  The minimum sentence 
Graham could receive was five years, and the maximum was life 
imprisonment.126  In explaining Graham’s sentence, the trial court 
stated:  
And I don’t understand why you would be given such a 
great opportunity to do something with your life and why 
you would throw it away. . . . [W]e can’t help you any 
further.  We can’t do anything to deter you. . . . I don’t see 
where any further juvenile sanctions would be 
appropriate. . . . [T]his is the way you are going to live your 
life . . . .127   
 
119. Compare id. at 578 (“The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of 
the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were 
committed.”), with Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“The battle 
must be fought . . . on the field of the Eighth Amendment; and in that struggle 
socioscientific, ethicoscientific, or even purely scientific evidence is not an available 
weapon.”), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
120. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 52–53 (2010). 
121. Id. at 53. 
122. Id. at 53–54. 
123. Id. at 54. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 55. 
126. Id. at 55–56. 
127. Id. at 56–57 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Seemingly resigned to Graham’s character, the trial court sentenced 
the seventeen-year-old to the maximum sentence authorized by law: 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.128  In the course 
of the case’s development, however, the Supreme Court ultimately 
took a different approach, relying on Roper.129  Citing the same three 
justifications from Roper,130 Graham extended Roper to protect 
juvenile non-homicide offenders sentenced to life without parole 
sentences.131  In particular, the Court dedicated much analysis to 
Graham’s character and the trial court’s finding that Graham’s 
character—at the age of seventeen—was firmly established for the 
rest of his life.132   
Citing “developments in psychology and brain science,”133 the 
majority concluded that “[j]uveniles are more capable of change than 
are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of 
‘irretrievably depraved character’ than are the actions of adults.”134  
Furthermore, the Court specifically noted that these scientific 
findings “continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile 
and adult minds,” such as “parts of the brain involved in behavior 
control,” which “continue to mature through late adolescence.”135  
In analyzing Graham’s punishment, the Court noted, “life without 
parole is ‘the second most severe penalty permitted by law,’”136 and 
bears strong similarity to a death sentence in that it “alters the 
offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable” and “deprives the 
convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of 
 
128. Id. at 57 (“Because Florida has abolished its parole system . . . a life sentence gives a 
defendant no possibility of release unless he is granted executive clemency.”). 
129. Id. at 67–69. 
130. Id. at 68 (“Roper established that because juveniles have lessened culpability they 
are less deserving of the most severe punishments.  As compared to adults, juveniles 
have a ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility’; they ‘are 
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, 
including peer pressure’; and their characters are ‘not as well formed.’” (quoting 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005))). 
131. See id. at 82. 
132. See id. at 72–73 (“To justify life without parole on the assumption that the juvenile 
offender forever will be a danger to society requires the sentencer to make a 
judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible.  The characteristics of juveniles make that 
judgment questionable.”) (emphasis added). 
133. Id. at 68 (relying on briefs from both the American Medical Association and the 
American Psychological Association in support of its assertions). 
134. Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570). 
135. Id.  Here, the Court is specifically citing developments in psychology on the delayed 
frontal lobe development in adolescent brains discussed supra in Section II.B.  See 
Sowell, supra note 30, at 860. 
136. Graham, 560 U.S. at 69 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)). 
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restoration . . . .”137  Essentially, the Court declared that a juvenile 
LWOP sentence “means denial of hope . . . that good behavior and 
character improvement are immaterial” to juvenile offenders.138   
Additionally, the Court concluded that none of the goals of the 
penal system are satisfied with the imposition of a juvenile LWOP 
sentence.139  When it comes to deterrence, juveniles’ “lack of 
maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility . . . often result 
in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions,”140 which 
means they are “less likely to take a possible punishment into 
consideration when making decisions.”141  Therefore, even when a 
juvenile does understand the potential consequences of an action, the 
individual still might not be deterred from action due to the 
adolescent brain’s susceptibility to peer pressure and a lack of 
behavioral control.142   
When considering the penological goal of rehabilitation, a juvenile 
LWOP sentence also fails.143  This is because an LWOP sentence 
rejects the very possibility of rehabilitation.144  As the Court explains, 
“[b]y denying the defendant the right to reenter the community, the 
State makes an irrevocable judgment about that person’s value and 
place in society,” and that “judgment is not appropriate in light of a 
juvenile nonhomicide offender’s capacity for change and limited 
moral culpability.”145  It is the fact that the sentencing judge 
determined Graham’s character to be “incorrigible” at the age of 
seventeen—thus making him worthy of an LWOP sentence—that the 
majority found to be Cruel and Unusual Punishment.146  
The Court makes clear that it is the denial of hope of release that 
distinguishes LWOP sentences from other types of sentences for 
juvenile offenders.147  A juvenile “who knows that he or she has no 
chance to leave prison before life’s end has little incentive to become 
 
137. Id. at 69–70. 
138. Id. at 70. 
139. Id. at 71–74. 
140. Id. at 72 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)); see also Less Guilty, 
supra note 84, at 2–3 (discussing underdeveloped impulse control in adolescents). 
141. Graham, 560 U.S. at 72; see also Less Guilty, supra note 84, at 2–3. 
142. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68–72. 
143. Id. at 74. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 76 (“In Graham’s case the sentencing judge decided to impose life without 
parole—a sentence greater than that requested by the prosecutor—for Graham’s 
armed burglary conviction.”). 
147. Alice Ristroph, Hope, Imprisonment, and the Constitution, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 75, 
75 (2010). 
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a responsible individual.”148  After Graham, “[a] State is not required 
to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a 
nonhomicide crime.”149  Instead, “[w]hat the State must do . . . is give 
defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”150   
As the Court acknowledges, some juvenile offenders will develop 
“irredeemable” characteristics and continue to commit serious crimes 
worthy of life imprisonment in their adult years.151  The Eighth 
Amendment, however, “prohibit[s] States from making the judgment 
at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter 
society.”152   
C.  Miller v. Alabama and Juvenile Life Without Parole for 
Homicide Offenses 
Graham v. Florida and the 2012 case Miller v. Alabama are often 
conflated in their effect on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, but 
there is an important distinction between the two.153  In Miller, the 
Supreme Court effectively extended the Eighth Amendment 
protection of Graham to juveniles who commit homicide.154  In its 
holding, the Court heavily relied on Graham, citing “juvenile’s 
‘lessened culpability’ and greater ‘capacity for change.’”155 
In Miller, two fourteen-year-old offenders were convicted of 
murder and given LWOP sentences.156  The Miller Court’s decision 
contained numerous quotations from Roper and Graham, and the 
Court took care to explain that “[o]ur decisions rested not only on 
common sense—on what ‘any parent knows’—but on science and 
social science as well.”157  The Court went through the same studies 
 
148. Id. at 76. 




153. Compare id. at 82 (“The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without 
parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.”) (emphasis 
added), with Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (“By requiring that all 
children convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration without possibility of 
parole, regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the nature of their 
crimes, the mandatory sentencing schemes before us violate this principle of 
proportionality, and so the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment.”) (emphasis added). 
154. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. 
155. Id. at 2460 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 50–51). 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 2464 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)). 
370 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 46 
that supported the holdings in Roper and Graham, stating “we cited 
studies showing that ‘[o]nly a relatively small proportion of 
adolescents’ who engage in illegal activity ‘develop entrenched 
patterns of problem behavior’ . . . . [A]s the years go by and 
neurological development occurs, [a juvenile’s] ‘deficiencies will be 
reformed.’”158 
In extending Roper and Miller to the protections of juvenile 
offenders who commit homicide, the Court emphasized that “the 
distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications 
for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when 
they commit terrible crimes,” such as homicide.159  When dissecting 
the facts of the two consolidated cases in Miller, the immature and 
reckless nature of both juveniles is strikingly obvious.160  
For example, Kuntrell Jackson, who was sentenced to LWOP for 
capital felony murder of a video store clerk and aggravated 
robbery,161 “did not fire the bullet” nor did he “intend[] [the victim’s] 
death.”162  Instead, Jackson “learned on the way to the video store 
that his friend . . . was carrying a gun.”163  The Court fleshed out 
Jackson’s culpability and the effect of peer pressure, stating, “his age 
could well have affected his calculation of the risk that posed, as well 
as his willingness to walk away at that point.”164 
Ultimately, the Court held that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a 
sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of 
parole for juvenile offenders.”165  Like Graham, the State is not 
compelled to “guarantee eventual freedom” to juvenile offenders, but 
it does have to offer “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release 
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” 166  Under Miller, 
“youth is more than a chronological fact. . . . [J]ust as the 
chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of 
great weight, so must the background and mental and emotional 
development of a youthful defendant be duly considered” in 
determining a juvenile’s culpability.167  
 
158. Id. at 2464–65 (first quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570; then quoting Steinberg & Scott, 
supra note 97, at 1014). 
159. Id. at 2465 (emphasis added). 
160. Id. at 2468–69. 
161. Id. at 2460. 
162. Id. at 2468. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 2469. 
166. Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 50 (2010)). 
167. Id. at 2467 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982)). 
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IV.  ALTERNATIVES TO JUVENILE INCARCERATION 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, fear of juvenile crime 
undermined the foundation on which the juvenile court system was 
based.168  State legislatures and the federal government pushed for 
more transfers to adult prisons over juvenile courts, requiring 
juveniles to be treated as equal to adult offenders in both “culpability 
and understanding” of crimes committed.169 
In light of Roper, Graham, Miller, and the corresponding research 
on juvenile brain development, a number of large research studies 
indicate that the prosecution of juvenile offenders in adult criminal 
court significantly increases the likelihood that the youth will commit 
violent or other crimes in the future.170  More than a decade of 
experience demonstrates that public safety can be secured without 
heavy reliance on incarceration.171   
Juvenile correctional facilities were created with the idea of 
rehabilitating youth, but in most cases, they do nothing more than 
simply house troubled juveniles.172  Recidivism studies show that 
fifty to seventy percent of youth released from correctional facilities 
are arrested again within two years.173  Relatedly, the harm that 
incarceration of youth can cause has been more fully understood.174  
Studies show that congregating delinquent juveniles teaches new 
illegal behaviors and increases the likelihood of reoffending.175   
In the past twenty years, however, successful models have emerged 
for reducing reliance on both local detention and large state 
correctional facilities for juvenile offenders without jeopardizing 
 
168. See Malcom C. Young & Jenni Gainsborough, Prosecuting Juveniles in Adult Court: 
An Assessment of Trends and Consequences, SENT’G PROJECT 2 (Jan. 2000), 
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/sp/juvenile.pdf. 
169. Id. 
170. See, e.g., id. at 9. 
171. See BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG, THE DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE 
IMPACT OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE 
FACILITIES 6 (2006), http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/06-
11_rep_dangersofdetention_jj.pdf. 
172. See id. at 2. 
173. JUSTICE POLICY INST., THE COSTS OF CONFINEMENT: WHY GOOD JUVENILE 
JUSTICE POLICIES MAKE GOOD FISCAL SENSE 16 (2009), 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/09_05_REP_CostsOfConfinement_JJ_P
S.pdf. 
174. See Thomas J. Dishion et al., When Interventions Harm: Peer Groups and Problem 
Behavior, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 755, 755 (1999). 
175. Id. at 761 (“Developmental research suggests peer deviancy training is associated 
with subsequent increases in substance use, delinquency, and violence, as well as 
adjustment difficulties in adulthood.”). 
372 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 46 
public safety.176  Launched in the 1990s by the Annie E. Casey 
Foundation, the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) has 
created a model for effectively reducing the juvenile justice system’s 
reliance on detention while maintaining public safety.177  JDAI began 
with five pilot sites in 1992 and now has 110 sites in twenty-seven 
states.178  JDAI model sites throughout the nation have seen juvenile 
arrests “for serious violent offenses decline by 27 percent, 43 percent, 
and 46 percent, respectively.”179 
Through models such as JDAI, the State can reduce its reliance on 
detention and imprisonment, and even save taxpayers a substantial 
amount of money.180  When weighing the holdings of Roper, 
Graham, and Miller, it is important to note that—not only should the 
death penalty or LWOP sentences be constitutionally barred for 
adolescents—but also, imprisonment should not be the default 
punishment for juvenile offenders.  Better alternatives exist.181 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Rhetoric surrounding juvenile offenders vacillates between 
characterizations of juveniles as naïvely impulsive and dangerously 
criminal.182  This conflicting imagery likely will continue to exist 
throughout the media and sensationalized news stories.183  Despite 
the depiction of juveniles as irreparably violent, neuropsychological 
research from the past three decades has disproved this notion.184   
With such overwhelmingly clear scientific evidence, Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence for juvenile offenders has significantly 
changed.185  Even though Justice Scalia was adamant that, 
“socioscientific, ethicoscientific, or even purely scientific 
evidence”186 had no influence over constitutional arguments, a trend 
nonetheless began with Roper, Graham, and Miller.187  These 
Supreme Court decisions demonstrate that neurological and 
 
176. See, e.g., RICHARD A. MENDEL, TWO DECADES OF JDAI: FROM 
DEMONSTRATION PROJECT TO NATIONAL STANDARD 2 (2009), 
http://youthlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/JDAI_Report.pdf. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 8. 
179. Id. at 2. 
180. Id. at 3. 
181. See, e.g., id. at 2–3. 
182. Morse, supra note 41, at 15. 
183. See id. 
184. Ritter & Associated Press, supra note 75. 
185. See cases cited supra note 29. 
186. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
187. See supra Sections III.A–C. 
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psychological research is now firmly rooted in Eighth Amendment 
arguments.188  With viable alternatives to juvenile imprisonment, the 
trend of scaling back severe punishments for juvenile offenders 
should continue.189  In fact, more recently, in Montgomery v. 
Louisiana,190 the Supreme Court decided whether Miller v. Alabama 
applies retroactively to approximately 2300 individuals currently 
serving LWOP sentences for murder convictions.191  Ultimately, the 
Court held that state courts must give retroactive effect to new 
substantive rules of federal constitutional law.192  Thus, because the 
Court concluded that Miller v. Alabama announced a new substantive 
rule of constitutional law, Miller applies retroactively to those already 
sentenced to LWOP.193  The Supreme Court’s mandate of retroactive 
applicability of Miller only serves to bolster the movement toward 





188. See supra Sections III.A–C. 
189. See MENDEL, supra note 176, at 8–9, 32. 
190. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
191. Id. at 732. 
192. Id. at 729–30. 
193. Id. at 736. 
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